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BLOOD TESTS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS-
BREITHAUPT REVISITED
Petitioner, in Breithaupt v. Abram,' was involved in a traffic accident in which
several persons were killed. A near-empty whiskey bottle was found in the glove
compartment of his pickup. While he lay unconscious in a hospital emergency
room, liquor was smelled on his breath. At a state patrolman's request, the
attending physician withdrew a sample of petitioner's blood with a hypodermic
needle. Subsequent laboratory analysis indicated that the blood contained .17 per
cent alcohol. At his trial for involuntary manslaughter, the results of the blood
test were admitted as evidence that he had been driving while under the influence
of alcohol.
On appeal petitioner claimed that a three-fold violation of his constitutional
rights had occurred. Relying on the proposition that the "generative principles" of
the Bill of Bights should extend the protections of the fourth and fifth amendments
to his case through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,2 he
claimed a violation of the fourth amendment in that the taking of the sample
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, and a violation of the fifth amend-
ment, in that the admission of the test results into evidence compelled him to be a
witness against himself.3 He also claimed that the conduct of the state officers
constituted a violation of the fourteenth amendments guarantee of due process.4
The court did not feel it necessary to consider his first two contentions since it
was then established law that the fifth amendment was not applicable to the
states,5 and that the states were free to reject, as had been done here, the ex-
clusionary rule that prohibited the admission in a criminal proceeding of any
evidence obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. 6 However, the court did note that petitioner
would have an argument were the rule applicable.7
Thus, the case was decided solely upon a consideration of petitioner's third
contention: that the conduct of the state officers was "shocking" and offended a
"sense of justice" and therefore was in itself a violation of due process.8 He relied
upon Rochin v. California,9 in which the Supreme Court found such a violation
when state officers forcibly employed a stomach pump to extract evidence. How-
ever, the Court could find nothing comparable to the facts in Rochin.10 It con-
sidered the invasion to be slight since blood tests were by them routine. It theu
set the right of the individual that his person -be held inviolable against the
interests of the community in scientific determination of intoxication. Citing the
deterrent effect of public appreciation of the conclusiveness of such tests, the
1352 U.S. 432 (1957).
2 Id. at 434.
8Ibid.
AId. at 435.
5 Palko v. Connecticut, 312 U.S. 319 (1937).
SWolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). This case stated that the fourth amend-
ment was binding upon the states, but held that the exclusionary rule was not.
7 352 U.S. at 434.
8 Id. at 435.
9342 U.S. 165 (1952).
10 352 U.S. at 435.
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Court concluded that the individual's rights were far outweighed by the interests
of the community."1
Although the issue was then thought to be settled, in the eight years since
Breithaupt the Supreme Court has established precedents which would require a
very different approach to the problem were a similar fact situation to come before
it today. It is the purpose of this note to consider whether this new approach would
necessarily require a different result.
Under the Fourth Amendment
In Mapp v. Ohio12 the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained through
an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in state as well as federal courts.
This holding invalidates the Court's basis for dismissal of petitioner's first conten-
tion in Breithaupt, and focuses attention on its comment that the decision might be
otherwise were the exclusionary rule applicable.
The effect of Mapp upon the criminal law enforcement system of -the individual
states was left in doubt, since the Court did not discuss the question of what kinds
of searches and seizures would be considered "unreasonable."' 3 The issue was
clarified somewhat by Ker v. California,14 where the Court decided that Mapp did
not wholly obliterate state search and seizure laws,' 5 nor establish the standard of
reasonableness. 16 The Court, while emphasizing that state standards must be
consistent with constitutional guarantees, recognized that the circumstances facing
state courts were as varied as the investigative and enforcement techniques em-
ployed by their law enforcement agencies.'
7
In Ker, state officers had probable cause to believe defendant had committed,
and was committing, a felony' 8 and that the evidence would be destroyed if they
delayed in acting.'9 Failing to give the notice of authority and purpose required
by statute,20 the officers broke into his apartment and arrested him. A search at
the time uncovered the evidence used for conviction. 2 ' If this method of entry
was unreasonable, Mapp would prevent admission of the evidence since the
subsequent arrest and search would be unlawful. The court reasoned that the
"exigent circumstances"2 2 justified the failure to comply with the statute.23
1l Id. at 439-40.
12367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Is Note, Aftermath of Mapp v. Ohio, 29 BrooxLYN L. REv. 98 (1962).
14374 U.S. 23 (1963).
'5 Id. at 31.
16 Id. at 32; see also Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 D=z
L.J. 319 (1962).
17 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
18 Id. at 35. "Every person.., who possesses any marijuana... shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one year and no more than ten
years.. ." Cr. HEA.LT & SAF= CODE § 11530.
19 Id. at 42.
20 "To make an arrest... a peace-officer, may break open the door or window of
the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable
grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the
purpose for which admittance is desired." CAL. Pm. CODE § 844.
21374 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1963).
22 Id. at 41 (felony being committed and destruction of evidence imminent)
23 The dissent argued that federal standards of reasonableness were indeed broken
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In Breithaupt, though there was no warrant or arrest, the officers undoubtedly
had probable cause to believe that petitioner had been driving his vehicle while
intoxicated.2 4 There also was no question that destruction of the evidence was
imminent.25 These circumstances are similar to -those of Ker, where constitutional
standards of reasonableness were not exceeded. 26
Recently two courts faced fact situations nearly identical to those involved in
Breithaupt and came to different conclusions as to the reasonableness of the blood
test. A California court in People v. Hube 27. held that where investigating officers
had reason to believe that the driver was intoxicated and had caused the accident,
and where there was no other means available to prevent destruction of evidence
of the alcohol content of the blood of an unconscious driver, there were exceptional
circumstances which justified taking a blood sample without a warrant, arrest, or
consent by the driver.28 This analysis follows that of the Supreme Court in Ker. As
in Breithaupt, the court appreciated "the imperative public interest involved."2 9
On the other hand, a New York court in People v. Young3O found the taking
of the sample unreasonable,3 ' dismissing Breithaupt as of no consequence, and
saying: "if the Breithaupt facts were today to be represented to the Supreme
Court, we think it reasonable to anticipate, in the light of Mapp v. Ohio, that the
court would condemn the police action here as an illegal search and seizure
violative of the Fourth Amendment."32 The court completely ignored the reasoning
of Ker that the particular circumstances of the case and any "exigent circum-
stances" are important in determining the reasonableness of the action in ques-
tion.83 In the light of Ker, it is difficult to justify the prophecy of the New York
court in Young.
Therefore, even in light of Mapp, a consideration of petitioner's search and
seizure argument should not change the Breithaupt result. The treatment of the
argument in Huber24 reinforces this conclusion. Ker allows local courts considerable
latitude, and even implies that the due process standards of Breithaupt and Rochin
may very well receive indirect recognition through an appreciation of the im-
portance of "exigent circumstances" in cases of this nature.3 5
and that the court's decision could rest only upon "an almost automatic assumption
that the suspect ... will attempt to destroy whatever possible incriminating evidence
he may have." Id. at 56.
24 There was a whiskey bottle in the glove compartment of petitioner's car and
liquor on his breath.
25 The amount of alcohol in the bloodstream diminishes with time, destroying the
incriminating evidence. This removes one of the principal objectios of the Ker dissent.
26374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963). Accord, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961), allowing search without a warrant and not incident to arrest under emergency
circumstances indicating that suspects are about to remove evidence.
27232 Cal. App. 2d 663, 43 Cal. Rpr. 65 (1965).
28 Id. at 670, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 70. •
29 Id. at 668, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
sD42 Misc. 2d 540, 248 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Westchester Co. Ct. 1964).
31 The court maintained that where no warrant has been employed and accused
is not yet under arrest, search and seizure is unreasonable.
32 42 Misc. 2d at 550, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
33 374 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1963).
34 232 Cal. App. 2d at 670, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
35 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
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Under the Fifth Amendment
The Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan3 6 extended the fifth-amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. This extension invalidates the basis for the Court's
,refusal to consider petitioner's second contention. There is, however, considerable
doubt whether this privilege would aid the petitioner.
The privilege against self-incrimination originated in reaction to the practice
of early English courts of compelling defendants to give testimony as to their
guilt.37 It was originally limited to testimonial compulsion,3 8 and the majority of
the cases have retained this limitation, 9 although two other views have achieved
some recognition. One view would admit evidence gathered through passive
assistance of the accused but would reject it if the accused was compelled actively
to participate.40 Even if this approach were followed, the blood test would be
admissible since petitioner's participation was merely passive. The second view,
of recent origin, was adopted by Justices Black and Douglas in Breithaupt4 l and
Rochin.42 It holds that the use of any compulsion upon the accused brings the
evidence so obtained within the privilege. 43 In Huber, the court dismissed without
discussion defendant's contention that this right was violated, 44 while the court
in Young came to the same conclusion 45 after careful consideration of the views of
Black and Douglas. Since there is no indication that their views have gained
majority status in the Supreme Court, the application of the fifth amendment to
the states does not aid petitioner.
Under the Sixth Amendment
Breithaupt made no claim of a violation of the right to counsel guaranteed him
by the sixth amendment.46 Gideon v. Wainwright47 first applied the right to
representation by counsel at trial to the states through the due process clause.
Gideon alone does not provide a reason to reconsider Breithaupt, since the dis-
386378 U.S. 1 (1964).
87 MCCOi.UCK, EVIDENCE § 120 (1954).
88 Ibid.
89 United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954); People v. Lewis,
152 Cal. App. 2d 824, 313 P.2d 972 (1957); People v. Contemo, 170 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 817, 339 P.2d 968 (App. Dep't Super. Ct., Los Angeles, 1959); State v. Smith,
91 A.2d 188 (Del. Super. Ct. 1952); State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Tanchyn, 200 Pa. Super. 148, 188 A.2d 824 (1963); Walton v.
Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963); 8 WIGMouB, EVIDENCE § 2250
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Contra, Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954 (Okla. Crim. 1964);
Owens v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 613, 301 S.W.2d 653 (1957).
40 McCowmni, EvmENcE § 126 (1954).
41352 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1957) (dissent).
42 342 U.S. 165, 174, 177 (1952) (concurring opinion).
43 See McCoiumcx, EvIDmENcE § 126 (1954).
44 232 Cal. App. 2d 663, 672, 43 Cal. Rptr. 65, 70 (1965).
45 42 Misc. at 551-52, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
46 This point also was not raised in Huber or Young.
1- 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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puted blood test took place prior to the trial. However, Escobedo v. Illinois48
which held that the right to counsel may accrue at the time of police interrogation,
raises the question of whether it would apply to Breithaupt. There, the Supreme
Court held that once an investigation focuses upon a particular suspect who is in
custody, and the police begin a process of interrogation designed to elicit in-
criminating statements, if the suspect requests and is denied assistance of counsel
and is not warned of his constitutional right to remain silent, 'he has been denied
his constitutional right to counsel and no statement elicited from him may be used
as evidence against him.49 A waiver of this right is possible only if done knowingly
and intelligently.59 In order to determine when this critical stage has been reached,
the nature of the particular proceeding and the circumstances of the case must be
considered.51
It is apparent that Escobedo does not apply to the particular fact situation of
Breithaupt. As the Court in Escobedo makes clear,52 the purpose of allowing a
prisoner to see his attorney at the time of interrogation is to assure that he is
effectively advised of his rights-in that case, the right to remain silent-so that
he can intelligently decide whether to waive them. He is prejudiced by denial of
his right to counsel only if he "waives" his rights without being fully advised. In
Breithaupt, petitioner, being unconscious, neither gave nor withheld his consent
to the blood test. Therefore, since he did not "waive" his rights, the denial of
petitioner's right to counsel, if there were such a denial, did not prejudice him.53
Conclusion
Although a "revisiting" of Breithaupt would involve radically different prece-
dent and problems, the decision of the Supreme Court should not change. In
addition to the factors previously mentioned, practical considerations make an
extension of the privileges of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to Breithaupt
unwise. The increasing slaughter on the nation's highways, as well as the increase
in crime in general, may be prevented best through the use of modem criminal
investigative techniques. These techniques would be severely hampered by an
interpretation of what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure that allows
the guilty to go unpunished. It is within the authority of Congress and state
legislatures to create alternate methods of deterring police misconduct in this
area. An application of the fifth amendment as called for by petitioner could easily
lead to the extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to other modem
police investigative procedures, such as fingerprinting and photo identification. An
extension of the Escobedo doctrine to Breithaupt would seriously impede routine
police investigative methods. As the criminal element of our society grows more
48 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
49 Id. at 490-91.
5o Id. at 490 n.14.
51 Id. at 488.
52 Ibid.
53 The question of whether Escobedo applies to blood-test cases in which the suspect
was conscious when the blood sample was taken is beyond the scope of this note. An
indication that it would not apply will be found in People v. Bellah, 237 A.C.A. 129,
46 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1965).
NOTES
144 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
resourceful, so must our law enforcement agencies, if the public is to be protected.
This problem was appreciated by the court in Breithaupt and a sound decision
resulted. Such policy considerations provide perhaps the best argument for allow-
ing that decision to remain unchanged. 54
Jerry M. Duncan*
54 Implied-consent statutes raise problems beyond the scope of this note. For an
able discussion, see Comment, Chemical Tests and Implied Consent, 42 N.C.L. REv.
841 (1964).
* Member, Second Year Class.
